The publications in this series cover a wide range of subjects-from computer modeling to experience with water user associations-and vary in content from directly applicable research to more basic studies, on which applied work ultimately depends. Some research reports are narrowly focused, analytical and detailed empirical studies; others are wide-ranging and synthetic overviews of generic problems.
Summary
Thousands of small reservoirs dot the rural landscape of sub-Saharan Africa. They have long attracted development and academic i n t e r e s t o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e y m a k e vulnerable and generally little-developed regions 'drought-proof' and allow for smallscale community-based irrigation. On the other hand, concerns have long been raised over the high construction costs, poor irrigation performance, low managerial capacity on the part of communities and little sustainability of investments that seem to be locked in a build-neglect-rebuild syndrome. A common response to these shortcomings has been to improve project designs and organize farmers in Water User Associations (WUAs) to better manage their common resources. This report, however, calls for a different approach based on a renewed understanding of small reservoirs. Drawing information from a crosscountry comparative analysis conducted in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Ethiopia and Zambia, this report argues that high costs are not inherent to the technology but are caused by major shortcomings in the planning and implementation processes. Non-standard and corrupt practices throughout the project cycle add to the costs and affect the quality of construction and hence the performance, a n d t h e f a r m e r s ' a b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n t h e reservoir in a workable state. Performance assessments are centered on downstream irrigation activities and universally point to the disappointing results of small reservoirs in these terms. Such assessments are grounded in field observations but remain partial. Small reservoirs support, and enhance synergies b e t w e e n , m u l t i p l e l i v e l i h o o d s t r a t e g i e s . The performance of small reservoirs needs to be assessed against this backdrop of multiple uses/users. WUAs, often externally triggered, have been framed and instituted as the sole and most adequate structure for the management of small reservoirs, with generally disappointing results. This is because decision making on small reservoirs takes place in multiple and overlapping arenas; the concerns of users may thus be best addressed by promoting arrangements that enhance multiple institutional relationships at multiple scales. An integrative approach, both in spatial (the watershed) and temporal (the project cycle) terms, holds the promise of sustainable management of small reservoirs.
Introduction
Small reservoirs have long attracted development and academic attention worldwide. They are known under multiple names in various regions of the world: tanks or johads in South Asia, açudes in Brazil, small reservoirs or micro-dams in sub-Saharan Africa, and lacs collinaires in North Africa. Defining what 'makes' a small reservoir is, however, not agreed upon, as the criteria and thresholds considered can vary widely among regions and actors. 1 This is not due to a lack of knowledge but rather to the multiplicity of meanings and the inherent tensions that characterize small reservoirs. L o n g e n v i s i o n e d a s s o i l a n d w a t e r conservation and drought-proofing measures, small reservoirs have, over the last three decades, been increasingly seen as a way to develop small-scale irrigation, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Venot and Krishnan 2011) . This discursive shift has taken place over the past three decades and echoes several major rural development discourses. First, the growing disenchantment with the costs involved and the social and environmental consequences of large-scale multi-purpose dams (WCD 2000) has led to growing attention being given to smallscale projects (McCully and Pottinger 2009 ).
Second, small-scale projects are made all the more appealing by their compatibility with current 'decentralization' and 'participation' rhetoric. Third, there has been increasing researchbased evidence that small-scale, farmer-based, irrigation could indeed have significant positive impacts on livelihoods, as observed in South Asia (see, for instance, Martin and Yoder 1987; Yoder 1994) . Fourth, irrigation has been gaining importance once again as a potential driver of agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2007) , where a concerted effort is taking place to stimulate a home-grown 'Green Revolution'.
As a result, past and current debates on small reservoirs resonate with broader discussions about small-scale irrigation in the developing world.
2 Three interrelated topics stand out: 1) the allegedly high investment costs per hectare irrigated (in comparison to South Asia, in particular); 2) the allegedly low performance of small reservoirs in terms of irrigated production; and 3) the allegedly low level of community organization to ensure proper operation and maintenance. Based on a crosscountry comparative analysis conducted in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Ethiopia and Zambia, this report probes some common wisdoms related to these three disputed themes. First, we address the question of investment costs (see the section, From the Onset: Planning and Implementing Small Reservoir Projects); we specifically look into the consequences of planning and implementation practices, inclusive of corrupt practices, on the costs of small reservoir projects. Second, we question the current understandings and measurements of the performance of small reservoirs (see the section, Looking at Performance From a Multiple Users/uses Perspective); they embed efficiency, optimization and productivity concerns that underpin mainstream development paradigms but fail to account for multiple livelihood strategies. Third, we investigate the notion of participation in the form of 'community governance', and the related attempts to craft the 'right institution' for managing small reservoirs that often fail to recognize multiple decision-making processes (see the section, Local Arrangements for Management: Questioning the WUA Model). A short conclusion calls for a shift away from the focus on irrigation towards the recognition that small reservoirs are sociopolitical entities that serve multiple purposes, at multiple levels for multiple actors.
Small Reservoirs: Some Elements of Perspective Current Understanding of Small Reservoirs in Sub-Saharan Africa
As agriculture is back on the development agenda as a "vital development tool for achieving the Millennium Development Goals" (World Bank 2007), projects and reforms dedicated to agricultural water management are experiencing renewed interest worldwide. In sub-Saharan Africa, this interest is notably articulated in the Comprehensive A f r i c a A g r i c u l t u r e D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m (CAADP), formulated by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), in which water management and irrigation development feature as one of the "areas for primary action." Though the program aims for multiple and integrated answers to the current challenges in agriculture, it clearly prioritizes "the identification and preparation of investments to support small-scale irrigation" (NEPAD 2003: 28) , including small reservoirs. Interest in small-scale irrigation (and in small reservoirs, in particular) reflects broad changes in rural development thinking. As early as the 1960s, small farms had been framed as motors of rural development. This paved the way to a participatory and bottom-up rhetoric (for instance, see Chambers et al. 1989 ) that emerged in the 1980s, and notably underpinned a sustained interest in farmer-managed irrigation schemes, particularly in South Asia (Martin and Yoder 1987; Yoder 1994) . More recently, the early 1990s witnessed another boom in academic and development interest in small-scale irrigation, this time in sub-Saharan Africa (Alam 1991; Turner 1994; Vaishnav 1994) . Two phenomena, in particular, may explain this interest; first, the droughts of the 1970s that dramatically affected agriculture and livelihoods in sub-Saharan Africa; and second, the controversy around largescale dams, their costs, and their social and environmental consequences (WCD 2000) . These two phenomena coincided with calls for decentralization of decision-making and participation of local users in the management of natural resources. Venot and Hirvonen (Forthcoming) show that this cyclical, yet, continued interest in small reservoirs finds its roots in the instant capacity of the latter to lend themselves to dominant discourses of development, governance, environment, ecotechnology and knowledge production alike.
At the core of our current 'understanding' of small reservoirs there appears to be a dichotomy: small reservoirs have tremendous potential but, to date, have largely failed to live up to expectations. On the one hand, small reservoirs are in high demand among local communities, are a priority for national governments and continue to attract funding from development agencies (Venot and Cecchi 2011 ). They are said to limit rural outmigration, enhance the incomes of the local population (Fromageot et al. 2006 ) and contribute to food security (Savy et al. 2006 ) by supporting multiple livelihood strategies such as livestock rearing, small business water use, handicraft activities and, increasingly, small-scale irrigation (Cecchi 2007) . Further, they are seen as an option to buffer against extreme weather events and changing climatic patterns .
On the other hand, many studies point to the low performance levels of small reservoirs, notably in terms of little irrigated area, damaged infrastructure and low water or agricultural productivity, and propose technical improvements (Faulkner et al. 2008; Mdemu et al. 2009; Mugabe et al. 2003) . Others highlight the governance challenges faced by small reservoir projects, both at the local (participation and empowerment) and national levels (see, for instance, Birner et al. 2010; ). In addition, sustainability issues are raised at two levels. First, some scholars question the frequent need for rehabilitation in a process that echoes the build-neglect-rebuild syndrome described by Shah (2009) for public irrigation systems in South Asia. Second, emerging evidence shows that uses of small reservoirs can contribute towards environmental deterioration (erosion of the shoreline due to upstream pumping and decreasing water quality) and have adverse health impacts such as malaria (Ghebreyesus et al. 1999) , though adequate management can lead to improved human health Boelee et al. 2009 
Methods: The Need for Interdisciplinarity
This report focuses on four countries in subSaharan Africa: Burkina Faso and Ghana in West Africa; and Ethiopia and Zambia in eastern and southeastern Africa. These countries were selected, first, because they are illustrative of diverse settings of sub-Saharan Africa; this enables both context-specific observations and common insights that will be relevant for the continent to be drawn. Second, the four countries have witnessed significant investments (past or recent) in small reservoirs. The multivalent character of small reservoirs calls for adopting an interdisciplinary approach drawing on multiple methods to generate both qualitative and quantitative data. Table 2 lists the methods, tools and data this report relies on in relation to the different issues/results that are discussed therein.
We collected data in a sequential process between April 2009 and October 2011. First, a baseline inventory of all small reservoirs in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Ethiopia and Zambia was prepared using existing secondary data. Second, a rapid regional appraisal was conducted in specific regions with a high concentration of small reservoirs: the two northern regions of Ghana (the Upper East and Upper West regions; 364 reservoirs); the center-south region of Burkina Faso (249 reservoirs); the region of Tigray in northern Ethiopia (26 reservoirs); and the southern region of Zambia (205 reservoirs). The rapid regional appraisal consisted of organizing working sessions with extension agents of the ministry in charge of agriculture and water at the district level. Detailed information was collected on: (1) the characteristics of the dams; (2) their design purposes and actual uses; (3) their level of performance; (4) the constraints faced by the communities; (5) the benefits derived from using the small reservoirs; and (6) the local institutional arrangements and modes of management. Third, 41 randomly sampled small reservoirs in Ghana (24), Burkina Faso (13) and Ethiopia (4) were studied in detail to gain a qualitative understanding of the multiple uses and perceptions of small reservoirs. In each site, the detailed case studies involved participatory exercises (focus group discussions, transect walks), semistructured interviews with users of individual small reservoirs (rainfed and livestock farmers, irrigators, fishermen, women) and key informant interviews in the community (elected local representative, head of organizations, customary authorities, representative of WUAs and Comités Locaux de l'Eau). In addition to local-level studies, we also conducted key informant interviews with policymakers (in ministries and bureaus of Water Resources, Agriculture, Irrigation and Environment at the national, regional and local level), donors and technical development partners (such as International Fund for Agricultural Development 
Notes:
‡ In sub-Saharan Africa, investment costs for small-scale irrigation are typically evaluated at USD 2,000-5,000/ha compared to less than USD 1,000/ha for inland valley bottom and soil and water conservation, and USD 5,000-10,000/ha and USD 10,000-20,000/ha for rehabilitation and construction of new large-scale projects, respectively (NEPAD 2003; Lankford 2005; Inocencio et al. 2007 ). † Small-scale irrigation (less than 100 ha) would account for 44% of all irrigated areas in Africa (Lankford 2005) . is -and is not -a small reservoir. Rather, we adopt a multidimensional approach that takes into account the multiplicity of meanings that small reservoirs can assume. 4 The second challenge is that of inventorying and locating small reservoirs (see Cecchi et al. 2009 for the situation in Burkina Faso), despite significant progress in remote sensing and geographic information system (GIS) techniques (Box 1; see Appendix 1 for country maps of small reservoirs).
Box 1. The promises and perils of remote sensing.
Remote sensing techniques and GIS have long been identified as a step towards improved information (see, for instance, Turner 1994) and scholars have increasingly used these techniques to detect small reservoirs (see, for instance, Liebe et al. 2005 Liebe et al. , 2009 Annor et al. 2009 ; such studies use satellite images and identify the specific signals rendered by open-water bodies). However, as for any research activities and results, remote sensing techniques and outputs are socially mediated. For instance, in Burkina Faso, the government entrusted a reputable private consultant to prepare an inventory of all small reservoirs in the country. This was carried out through remote sensing on the basis of 2001 Landsat images. Results were questioned as some reservoirs that were detected did not exist on the ground, while others, people claimed, had not been spotted. In 2010, after several groundtruthing campaigns and working sessions, the corresponding database was finally updated and validated by the government authority in charge of water resources information (Direction Générale des Ressources en Eau (DGRE)). Recognizing the inherent uncertainties that remain, the country is engaged in a continuous update of its centralized information system on water
resources (the Système d'Information sur l'Eau (SI-Eau)).
During this project, inventorying and locating small reservoirs proved to be a challenge in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Ethiopia and Zambia, with inconsistent, dispersed and partial information. The map below illustrates the challenges faced when using satellite imagery to detect small reservoirs (see also Cecchi et al. 2009 , for a discussion on the case of Burkina Faso). The map compares two sets of remote sensing information . Overall, the multiple remote sensing analyses are only consistent up to 30%. The inconsistency between the remote sensing analysis and secondary data (purple dots) is even higher. New constructions and ruptures of dams alone cannot explain such differences, nor can rainfall variability and related changes in water surface area. As for any research work, the methods used have tremendous bearing on the results and the maps that are produced, and can often serve to support decisions. In this particular case, differences in datasets can originate in the type of imagery used (low/high resolution), the date of acquisition of the image (rainy/dry season), the sensor used, the georeferencing, the methods used to classify land cover signatures (supervised/unsupervised) and delineate water bodies (digitization or not), the type of atmospheric correction, and treatment for clouds and land covers, which have a similar signature to open-water bodies (burned area and water weed), the quality of groundtruthing, etc.
(Continued)
Secondary data collected from several line ministries and rapid appraisals with extension agents at district level yielded a comprehensive inventory of existing small reservoirs in the four countries studied (Appendix 2 provides the number of small reservoirs for some selected countries where they appear to be widespread).
In Burkina Faso, most small reservoirs were constructed between 1974 and 1987 ( Figure 1 ), 5 largely in response to the Sahel droughts of the early 1970s and 1980s. The 1983-1987 period also corresponded to the 'Sankara socialist revolution' when the political leadership of Burkina Faso undertook large infrastructure construction projects, including roads, railways and small reservoirs, while promoting mass mobilization of the Burkinabè population (Sally et al. 2011 ). Since then, there has been a continuous commitment to build more infrastructure for small-scale irrigation. On average, more than 30 small reservoirs were built annually during the period 1985-2001 in the country, and a department of the Ministry Source: this study.
Our objective here is not a detailed investigation of the underpinnings of the differences observed between the different datasets, nor is it to bring discredit to remote sensing work, which we consider very useful. Rather, we aim at bringing the need to critically assess remote sensing outputs to the reader's attention; this is all the more important as "a picture (a map) is worth a thousand words." of Agriculture and Water was set up in the early 2000s to coordinate the development and monitoring of small-scale irrigation, including small reservoir-based irrigation. Currently, several externally-funded projects 6 invest in rehabilitating and/or constructing new small reservoirs and the total number of small reservoirs and dugouts is evaluated at about 1,200 (DGRE database).
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In Ghana, considerable investments were made following independence in the 1960s (Figure 1 ), after which construction slowed down in the 1970s and 1980s. Since the mid-1990s, there has been renewed interest in small reservoir projects. This is mainly due to large donor-driven investments in the north of the country (see map in Appendix 1), among which FIGURE 1. History of the construction of small reservoirs in (a) Ghana, (b) Burkina Faso, (c) Zambia, and (d) Ethiopia.
Source: This study; based on secondary databases of relevant ministries. Construction date is available for 2,445 out of 3,522 dams and dugouts (e.g., about 70%) (536 out of 946 when limited to dams).
Note: UER -Upper East Region; UWR -Upper West Region
Source: This study; for the southern region, construction date is available for 152 out of 205 sites that were documented. The database of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO) remains incomplete; it shows 820 records even though NCG (2010) of dams in the country. Regarding rehabilitation, NCG (2010) (Venot and Cecchi 2011) . As at 2010, there are more than 1,000 small reservoirs in Ghana, half of which are located in the three northern regions of the country. 8 I n 1 9 9 4 , t h e E t h i o p i a n G o v e r n m e n t engaged in an ambitious plan to build 500 small reservoirs in the Tigray region in the northeast of the country, where small reservoirs make most sense due to intermittent surface water flows and low groundwater potential (see map in Appendix 1). The scheme was funded by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), together with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the World Bank, and implemented by the newly set up Commission for Sustainable Agriculture and Environmental Rehabilitation in Tigray (Co-SAERT). It aimed at developing small-scale irrigation for food security (Annen 2001; Aberra 2004) while generating labor opportunities to the population of a region devastated by decades of famine and political instability (Chris Annen, Helvetas, Ethiopia, pers. comm., August 5, 2010). The program proved challenging to implement, and disappointing results in terms of irrigation development were soon questioned. The program was discontinued (and the commission dismantled in 2002) also because of its high costs and due to lack of further funding (Leul Kahsay, Independent Consultant, pers. comm., September 23, 2010). The government priority shifted to local household ponds and later on to watershed management. By the early 2000s, the government had built 50 small dams. This did not mark the end of investments in small reservoirs as local organizations such as the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) and international donors such as the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) (French Agency for Development) continued to invest in rehabilitating and constructing dams (AFD and REST 2003) . By 2010, there were about 110 small reservoirs in the Tigray region and they are seen as pivotal for the development of the region.
Lack of data in Zambia makes it difficult to get an accurate picture of the history of small reservoirs in the country. It appears that the construction of small reservoirs remained limited until the 1940s; during the colonial period, settlements were centered along the railway line with the purpose of feeding mining communities in the Copperbelt and at Kabwe. Beyond context-specificities, small reservoirs assume a significant role in the agricultural water management landscape in the four countries focused on for this study. Investments in small reservoirs should be seen in a broader historical perspective and appear closely linked to sociopolitical choices. Three broad trends can be highlighted. First, investment in small reservoirs is grounded in a dual rationale of providing water for drought-relief and developing irrigation activities. Second, despite the recent focus on irrigation, only a minority of small reservoirs in the regions studied were equipped with irrigation infrastructure (thus, calling for revising our understanding of performance; see the section, Looking at Performance From a Multiple Users/ uses Perspective).
10 Third, most investments are made 'in bulk' to meet targets and quotas, that is, governments and donors engage in ambitious plans to rehabilitate or build significant numbers of reservoirs, generally, in a short time period, thus raising planning and implementation challenges as described in the following section.
From the Onset: Planning and Implementing Small Reservoir Projects 11 Planning Shortcomings and Corruption: Perverse Incentives and Circumstances
Identification and planning processes have a tremendous bearing on the outcome and performance of water development projects, yet, they remain largely overlooked (a notable exception is Morardet et al. 2005) . This is also true for small reservoirs. Donors, line ministries, local authorities, contractors and communities all face difficulties that result in spiraling costs, delays in implementation, poor construction and the failure of small reservoirs to perform as envisioned. Our analysis is based on two small reservoir initiatives that have been implemented in Ghana over the past two decades. The first initiative is a government-driven rehabilitation program conducted in 2009/2010 following floods that washed away scores of dams in the north of the country; the second is the continuous involvement of IFAD in the same region since the 1990s through multiple rural development projects that had small reservoir components (see Venot et al. 2011 for further information on these two initiatives). The documented lapses are not confined to Ghana or to sub-Saharan African countries, but can be found in most planning exercises. We present our results thematically and Table 3 provides information on how, what can be best termed 'macro-level deficiencies' or 'inadequacies' unfold along the project cycle (Table 3 , column 2). We highlight that many of these shortcomings sprout from a tension between formal practices and a de facto logic of action, which constitutes the 'working rule' of development planning and public action in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond (Ferguson 2007; Bierschenk 2010 ). This tension breeds opportunities for corrupt practices. Based on multiple key informant interviews (see the section, Methods: The Need for Interdisciplinarity), we identify these daily working circumstances in the third column of Table 3 .
Perverse incentives drive investments in small reservoirs as donor agencies continue to value the number of programs and volume of funding over the outcomes of projects (Martinez and Shordt 2008) 12 ; they can even see corruption as having a functional role for The low quality of the feasibility studies often offers room for contractors to raise 'variation orders' (i.e., change in the initial design) as unexpected work may be required.
In many cases, these may be warranted, but the situation breeds opportunities for collusion between officials and contractors in the field, sometimes leading to excessive cost overruns (sometimes up to 50% of the planned investment; . Perverse incentives (notably the focus on funds disbursement) mean that 'demanddriven' approaches remain a mere rhetoric most of the time. Communities hardly contribute to project identification; though in later stages they often divert and adapt the project's activities to meet their own ends.
I n f o r m a t i o n f l o w , t r a n s p a r e n c y a n d accountability are weak and characterized by the absence of the local communities and authorities. Responsibilities are shared among multiple agencies, and within a single agency among multiple levels of decision making. Actors have different interpretations of the same situation; this leads to confusion, challenges accountability structures and opens the door to corrupt practices. Complexity of funding flows when there are multiple donors add to this complexity and further challenges accountability (in the case of Zambia, see NCG 2010).
Procurement processes and guidelines for the management of public funds generally look good on paper. However, there are many structural impediments to their actual enforcement, such as the low quality of the bidding documents and the lack of time, resources and capacity to evaluate the bids. The major underpinning of current practices remains the fact that award of contracts is largely perceived and accepted as a political action rather than a bureaucratic one. This affects the willingness and feasibility of enforcing rules in a system where most of the actors know and interact with each other in multiple ways. Contracts can easily be awarded to preferred contractors on any number of outwardly justifiable grounds, in exchange for "a token of our appreciation." Often, but not necessarily always, this means that unqualified or unsuitable contractors are selected with negative impacts on the quality of work. Collusion between contractors and public servants who can be hired as independent consultants by the former (so as to increase their chances of winning a contract or to circumvent policies and procedures) is also common. Finally, political patronage, which is part of the social fabric, underpins the selection of sites and beneficiaries as well.
Implementation is commonly delayed due to lack of technical know-how of contractors (see, for instance, World Bank and FAO 2007) and/or cumbersome administrative procedures regarding payments. This is a major threat to the cost and sustainability of rehabilitation and construction work, particularly when small contractors are involved and high inflation is the norm. Unrealistic time demands, procedural complexity and lack of transparency are frequent complaints on the part of contractors who feel they have no choice but to offer 'speed money' to facilitate processes. This adds to the transaction costs of contractors, which offers incentives to recoup these costs by further compromising the quality of work.
Monitoring and supervision of works does not receive adequate attention. Again, procedures look good on paper, but there is a widely shared lack of capacity and willingness to enforce regulations among government and donor agencies. A typical set up is to mandate site supervisors in local offices to conduct on-site monitoring and supervision visits. In reality, few of these offices are properly equipped or staffed to carry out their supervisory roles. Supervisors must, as a necessity, rely on contractors to conduct their work. This is an invitation to 'leniency', but is seen as 'reciprocity' rather than a lack of integrity. Conscientious supervisors can easily find themselves being 'transferred' at the behest of well-connected contractors.
Controlling Investment Costs to Improve Performance
The shortcomings described in Table 3 have serious implications for the investment costs and performance levels of small reservoirs, which are two hotly debated concerns. Our analysis relies mostly on data from Ghana (see the section, Methods: The Need for Interdisciplinarity, and for further information on the data used and methodology followed), but conclusions have a wider applicability. The results indicate that investment costs are highly skewed because a significant number of projects experience anomalies during the planning and implementation processes (Figure 2 ; see the section, Planning Shortcomings and Corruption: Perverse Incentives and Circumstances). W h e r e c o n t r a c t s a r e t e r m i n a t e d a n d re-awarded (either due to fraudulent practices or low performance on the part of contractors), investment costs may end up being ten times higher than when contracts are handled without major setbacks regardless of the main financer, government, international donor or nongovernmental organization (NGO).
14 This clearly highlights the importance of the planning 14 An analysis of a subset of 39 dams (for which data on impounded water volume was available) showed that there was no statistically significant difference in terms of the volume of water (hence size of reservoirs) between the group of dams for which contracts were terminated and re-awarded and the other group of dams (whether they were newly built or rehabilitated). In other words, the reservoir's size is NOT correlated to the termination of contract, which shows that flaws in planning and procurement can affect all small reservoirs alike.
FIGURE 2. Cost of investments in small reservoirs in the Upper East region of Ghana.
Source: This study.
Note: GIDA -Ghana Irrigation Development Authority.
and procurement processes in controlling investment costs. Even when there are no major concerns and contracts hold, lapses in planning cause delays in payment and/or implementation of works and this leads to increased costs, especially in a high-inflation context that is a characteristic of most sub-Saharan economies. Lack of financial transparency and corrupt behavior also lead to unduly increasing costs. In Ghana, for a sample of 40 recently rehabilitated reservoirs, contract amounts were, on average, 35% higher than technical estimates ( Figure  3(a) ). 15 This gap is partly due to differences in the rule of thumb adopted regarding contingencies that were fixed at 20% during the feasibility study and increased to 25% in the contract documents. Further changes in design through variation orders (linked to poor-quality feasibility study) may be another reason for such differences. However, this alone falls short of explaining a 35% discrepancy and tends to point towards overvaluation of contracts (see ). The case of preliminary payments (i.e., initial payment made to contractors before they start the work) is particularly interesting 15 Figure 3(a) does not consider 'above outliers' for which contract amounts were 2 to 8 times higher than technical estimates. 16 Performance of small reservoirs was qualitatively assessed on a scale from 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good) by extension agents of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, who seemed to especially value the conditions of the infrastructure (damaged or maintained) and the existence and extent of an irrigated area. Though individual extension agents may have considered slightly differing criteria to judge performance, the consistency of the explanations they gave to justify their scoring during our interviews gives us confidence to compare the scores given (see the section, Looking at Performance From a Multiple Users/Uses Perspective). We do not present performance assessment levels for the dams rehabilitated by GIDA, as most dams were broken or under rehabilitation at the time of our surveys in 2009 and hence ranked low.
here. While preliminary payments average 18%, they also vary between 4 and 65% of the total contract amount without any clear pattern or justification (Figure 3(b) ). High preliminary payments allegedly conceal various forms of 'kickback'; they also provide a perverse incentive for contractors to do low-quality work, if any . Figure 4 (a) highlights that controlling investment costs is not a vain quest. Over the last 10 years, 25% and 12% of the dams that were rehabilitated by the government (under the responsibility of the Ghana Irrigation Development Authority (GIDA)) and development partners (IFAD and NGOs), respectively, cost less than USD 5,000 per irrigated hectare. This proportion increases to 35% and 60% if a USD 10,000/ ha threshold is considered. While reducing investment costs is sound in economic terms it seems to also have a beneficial impact in terms of performance. Figure 4(b) shows that the small reservoirs that perform best (according to the views of extension agents) 16 are also those that cost less. This conclusion confirms earlier findings by Inocencio et al. (2007) . 
Looking at Performance From a Multiple Users/Uses Perspective
Assessment of irrigation performance is often seen as an important management tool to aid irrigation projects to deliver on their promises (Molden et al. 2007 ). Performance assessments have long been managerial in nature and limited to hydraulic, agronomic and economic indicators. More recently, they have been broadened to account for multiple uses of water, and environmental and gender dynamics (Bos et al. 2005; Meinzen-Dick and van der Hoek 2001; van Koppen 2002) . Institutional economists have also successfully argued for recognizing the institutional dimension of performance, when identifying 'guiding principles' for robust and enduring institutions for common property resource management (Ostrom 1990 ). This quick review shows that irrigation performance assumes multiple meanings for different people and purposes (Molden et al. 2007; Venot and Cecchi 2011) . In this section, we engage with the meaning and assessment of the performance of small reservoirs for two types of actors -the extension agents of the Ministry/Bureau of Agriculture and the local users. The former act as brokers between policy-making/planning and project implementation: their interpretation of events is passed on to higher levels of decision making through the state apparatus; they are effectively the 'foot soldiers' of national governments that seek rapid irrigation development. Local users, on the other hand, are the final stewards of small reservoirs and projects are implemented in their name. Results of regional appraisals show that agricultural extension agents who were asked to assess the performance of small reservoirs on a scale from 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good), considered that between one-third and two-thirds
The situation was deemed particularly critical in Ethiopia while Zambia and Burkina Faso have the highest proportion of reservoirs with average and high performance ( Figure 5) .
In all the countries, design and infrastructure problems were identified as the main causes for poor performance (in addition to siltation in the case of Ethiopia). Lack of proper planning and design and limited technical knowledge of contractors has not only rendered some (a) (b) reservoirs unusable but has also proven to be costly. Within a time span of 10 years, some small reservoirs have been rehabilitated twice or thrice due to the poorly executed projects.
A support mission by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on small reservoirs in northern Ghana, confirms the assertion of faulty design and poor quality of work due to lack of technical know-how and inadequate supervision (World Bank and FAO 2007) . Finally, the lack of community management in the form of a WUA was identified in all countries as another major cause for the low performance of small reservoirs. Extension agents assess the performance of small reservoirs through an engineering lens and in line with the objective of irrigation development. By voicing a concern over poor performance while reiterating the potential for irrigation benefits, extension agents provide a rationale for national governments to call upon external donors or their own governmental agency to fund rehabilitation or construction of small reservoirs. It also reinforces a 'buildneglect-rebuild' cycle that characterizes the public irrigation sector of sub-Saharan Africa. The relatively satisfactory assessment of the performance of small reservoirs by extension agents in Burkina Faso and Zambia is due to their explicit acknowledgement of watering livestock as being one of the main objectives and purposes of small reservoirs.
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Another level of complexity emerges from investigating the perceptions of local users. In most of the 37 communities studied in northern Ghana and southern Burkina Faso, the local population expressed a level of satisfaction similar or higher than the extension agents (see Table 4 ). 17 Somehow, contradictorily, extension agents in Burkina Faso give a lower-than-average score to reservoirs that do not command downstream irrigated areas; this clearly illustrate their 'irrigation-bias' towards performance. We then explored the satisfaction of users according to four main aspects: the physical infrastructure, the modes of management, the benefits derived and the equity aspects of small reservoirs. Similarly to the assessment carried out with extension agents, local users also pointed to poor technical and managerial performance. They, however, showed a higher level of satisfaction regarding the benefits they derived and the equity aspects of small reservoirs, showing that the latter are invested with social meaning (for a similar argument on natural resources, see Cleaver 2000) .
Populations value small reservoirs for multiple reasons. Table 5 presents the results of a free-listing exercise, during which local users were asked to identify the three main benefits they derived from small reservoirs. Benefits have been categorized into four main groups: basic, social, economic and environmental based on the answers given.
other activities. Limiting floods during the rainy season, improved greenness and biodiversity, and sustaining alternative economic activities (fisheries, brick-making, local breweries and paid agricultural labor) are also perceived as major benefits of small reservoirs. However, rural communities are not homogenous. The surveys revealed that small-scale water users (e.g., the poor, youth, women and fishermen) tend to give higher satisfaction scores when irrigation activities are little developed. Conversely, they face difficulties to reap direct benefits when intensive cultivation becomes the main goal or is the main activity. Performance ratings and satisfaction Some benefits are clearly linked to irrigation development (e.g., improved food security; enhanced productive activities; improved income), but the local population also value small reservoirs for other reasons. For instance, small reservoirs are said to (a) improve water availability for livestock and domestic uses, thus limiting migration; and (b) play a positive role on women's position within their household, notably because they can spend less time fetching water and divert that time towards levels depend on the vantage point of the actor considered and are a reminder of the need (and difficulties) to coordinate and integrate multiple users and social groups around a common resource such as a small reservoir. Recognizing multiple modes of access to, and uses of, small reservoirs calls for reviewing our understanding of their economic performance and modes of governance (Box 2; see the section, Local Arrangements for Management: Questioning the WUA Model).
Improved food security 58
Bathing 58
Improved access to domestic water (drinking/cooking) 55
Enhance women's position within the household 45
Recreation 41
Reduced migration (for domestic/livestock watering) 40
Improved water availability for livestock 70
Improved income from productive activities 49
Improved greenness and increased biodiversity 38
Improved weather conditions (freshness) 29
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Box 2. A cursory look at the economic performance and unplanned development of small reservoirs.
The economic benefits of irrigation have been widely documented (see, for instance, Hussain and Hanjra 2004; Hanjra et al. 2009 ). Small reservoir-based irrigation makes no exception. On average, a small reservoir serves about 2,500 people (e.g., about 400 households) and, among them, 50 to 100 households may take up irrigation activities in the downstream irrigated area. A survey of 16 small reservoir sites in Ghana indicate that irrigators can derive, on average, USD 350/household/year (with significant differences between households and small reservoir sites); this is equivalent to 5 months of work of a single individual if the minimum daily wage set up by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning of Ghana is considered. Small plot size (0.1 to 0.5 ha, depending on the allocation rules set by the implementer) does not allow for significant surplus production and makes irrigation only marginally profitable when compared to other economic opportunities that are generally sought for in nearby or distant urban centers. However, small plots can allow for enhanced equity (with more beneficiaries) and have beneficial impacts on nutrition. Positive impacts of small reservoirs on the revenue of farmers have also been documented in Zambia. NCG (2010) showed that access to small reservoirs induced a significant change in cropping patterns (from staple to vegetable crops) leading to a 70% increase in farmers' income. Similar observations have been found in Ethiopia, where access to small reservoirs is said to induce an increase in income of 12 to 66% (AFD and REST 2003) . The trend towards spontaneous development of a private pump-based, small-scale irrigation upstream of reservoirs, as observed in northern Ghana and Burkina Faso (and to a lesser extent, in Zambia), brings about significant benefits as well. It is not uncommon that the 'unofficial' irrigated area around the reservoir is much larger than the official command area downstream. For example, the Korsimoro Reservoir in Burkina Faso officially irrigates a command area of 35 hectares of rice downstream of the dam while more than 1,000 farmers pump water directly from the reservoir to irrigate 250 ha of vegetables upstream during the dry season. Such a practice is highly profitable (up to ten times the profitability of downstream irrigation; Ndanga Kouali 2011) but raises environmental (over-abstraction, resource degradation and pollution from agrochemicals) and governance issues. Economics of other small-reservoir based productive activities (livestock herding, fisheries, brewery, etc.) remain mostly unknown, but are likely to be significant. Katrien Descheemaeker (Assistant Professor, Wageningen University, pers. comm.) identified that small reservoirs can have a significant impact on livestock productivity and health, by limiting the movement of herds and contributing to fodder production.
for maintaining, managing and enhancing the performance of small reservoirs (see, for instance, IFAD 2009). In most cases, however, these WUAs remain promoted by outsiders rather than being the expression of a collective decision-making process emerging from the community.
To counter problems associated with alleged poor performance, the current blueprint for small-scale irrigation development is one of participatory community-led projects. However, as what can be described as a discursive shift, project implementers have asserted the primacy of WUAs as being the rightful entities
The performance and success of small reservoir projects is now partly determined by the number of WUAs that are set up alongside construction/rehabilitation work. Extension agents articulate this view; they express that the presence of WUAs is positively correlated to good performance (the proportion of WUAs among reservoirs that are performing well is higher than among reservoirs that are performing poorly: Figure 6(a) ).
19 Encouraging at first, this assessment and the conclusions that are generally inferred are, in fact, questionable. First, in absolute terms and among the reservoirs that are performing well (a score equal to or greater than 3), there are as many reservoirs with than without WUAs (not shown in Figure  6 ). This entails that the presence of a WUA is neither a prerequisite nor a guarantee for the good performance of small reservoirs. Second, among the 37 detailed case studies carried out, there was no clear correlation between the level of satisfaction of local users and the presence or absence of a WUA. Rather than creating the conditions for collective action and sustainable management, the WUA has become an 'institutional fix', which, by its very presence, is a pledge of the performance of small reservoirs. This 'institutional fix' is drawn from new institutional economics (Ostrom 1990) , which highlights the importance of clearly defined user groups, structures of authority, rigorous application of graduated sanctions and transparent decision-making that is codified in written records (Cleaver 2000) . The presence of clear structures of authorities (such as WUAs) is, for example, often considered as a prerequisite to any interventions (see among others, IFAD 2009), which is something local communities are fully aware of. The raison d'être of many village organizations in West Africa is indeed, "to wait for an external partner willing to work in the village" (Bernard et al. 2008 (Bernard et al. : 2198 ; their underperformance then being generally attributed to sociopolitical externalities such as the refusal of elites to relinquish powers, their tendency to corner benefits, and the lack of financial resources and professionalism. However, this framing overlooks the complexity and historicity of institutional formation.
While looking for the 'right institution', development actors have adopted an overformalized approach to institutional formation (for 19 Ethiopia stands alone with less than 10% of the small reservoirs having a WUA, irrespective of their performance level. This is linked to a more centralized system giving the primacy to the Bureau of Agriculture and farmer cooperatives over WUAs. In Zambia, the declining proportion of small reservoirs with a WUA (performance level of 3 and more) is not significant; it also shows that the existence of a WUA is neither a prerequisite nor a guarantee for the performance of small reservoirs.
(b) FIGURE 6. Performance, WUAs and the main decision makers as perceived by extension agents.
(a) a critique, see Cleaver and Franks 2005) . They engaged in, and sustained, a true search for panacea, which has been repeatedly critiqued (see, for instance, Ostrom et al. 2007 ) notably on the ground that it does not account for the polycentric nature of governance and decision making over natural resources (see, for instance, McGinnis 1999). We suggest here that in their insistence to establish "one-mode-fits-all" (the WUA), small reservoir projects embody narrow visions of the commons and participation. By asserting the primacy of WUAs as the rightful entities for maintaining and managing small reservoirs, projects undermine existing collective action institutions; institutions that may actually contribute to the good governance of small reservoirs.
This is not to say that WUAs do not have a role to play, but that major shortcomings (both procedural and structural) still remain for them to be able to fully contribute to the sustainable governance of small reservoirs. For instance, development partners still consider local actors as being recipients or 'beneficiaries' playing a given role in an overall 'concept' (GTZ 2003) rather than being participants with an agency in a communityled project. When stating that "the failure to complete the appraisal target [was] partly due to the time wasted 'sensitizing' the communities" (IFAD 2009: 291) , project workers and designers show the little value they give to interacting with communities and considering their priorities over the need to achieve targets that assume what "is good for the communities".
Structurally, WUAs appear to convey the experiences, perceptions and priorities of some segments of the population only. Indeed, 85% of the existing WUAs were centered on irrigators and less than half accounted for other smallscale water users, though the latter appear to derive less benefit when irrigation takes place. 20 Further, only 30 to 50% of the WUA (depending on the country) counted women as members, and rarely were they holding an executive position. Finally, WUAs do not account for the de facto institutional bricolage (Cleaver 2000) and the multiple collective action institutions that contribute to the governance of small reservoirs (Figure 6(b) ). 21 These actors assume different and complementary roles along the project cycle (see Figure 6 ; Table 6 ). Water committees (e.g., WUAs) were identified as being the main decision-making body on small reservoirs in only about one quarter of the cases, and their main tasks were considered as minor maintenance and daily management (Table 6 ). Line ministries and government agencies are rarely identified as being the main decision makers, but their role in procurement and construction processes and in supporting farmers (extension, marketing) is seen as crucial (Table 6 ). Finally, traditional authorities are seen as the most important decision makers regarding the uses and management of reservoirs in about 25% of the cases. They are crucial in settling disputes, resolving conflicts, maintaining social cohesion (when ad-hoc resolution mechanisms have not yielded any results), and overseeing land allocation and redistribution (Table 6 ). On the one hand, traditional authorities can lend their authority to the members and actions of the WUAs (Table 6 ). On the other hand, there is evidence that traditional authorities can simply corner responsibilities and associated benefits. Finally, many decisions are reached through consensus building at the community level (extension agents considered the community to be the main decision maker in 22% of the cases) without a specific organization being singled out. This is especially true in Zambia where most daily management tasks (maintenance, oversight of water delivery) were seen as being the responsibilities of the 'community' as a whole rather than those of a management committee. W e d o n o t s u g g e s t t h a t a t t e m p t s a t institutional building are doomed to failure. Rather, we fully share the views of Cleaver and Franks (2005) who, diagnosing that institutions partly elude design, argue that attempts at institutional intervention should be based on a much better understanding of social relationships, existing processes of decision-making and resource allocation. Small reservoir projects prove indeed to be the object of "competing forms of institutionalization: one backed by projects, the State and its bureaucracy, encoded in official language and often exercised with Benjaminsen and Lund (2002: 2) in the case of land and water rights. The issue is to understand these overlapping dynamics that define a true, but de facto, polycentric governance regime (McGinnis 1999) rather than assuming that an imposed and ostensibly apolitical organization can convey local dynamics and priorities. In the context of subSaharan Africa, understanding the institutional relationships that govern small reservoirs, and the way they link to broader political trends such as decentralization and IWRM policies, becomes crucial (Box 3).
Conclusion
Donors and national governments have long invested in small, communally managed reservoirs in rural sub-Saharan Africa. Investments have mimicked broad changes in rural development thinking, and were grounded in a dual rationale of providing water for drought relief and developing irrigation activities. Over the past decade, there has been a renewed interest in small reservoirs due to concerns over climate change and the related uncertainty of water supplies to people, crops and livestock. In regions where other sources of water (groundwater, perennial rivers) are not easily accessible, small reservoirs play a crucial role in providing water and supporting multiple livelihood strategies such as livestock rearing, small business water use, handicraft activities and, increasingly, small-scale irrigation. T h o u g h m o s t s m a l l r e s e r v o i r s w e r e n o t constructed and are not being used for agricultural purposes per se, the development and academic discussions around further investments have progressively shifted towards irrigation. Because of this emphasis towards productive uses, a different set of issues has emerged. Donors and governments started questioning the high investment costs and disappointing performance of small reservoirs. Further concerns are raised over the ability of communities to properly operate, manage and maintain their water infrastructure (i.e., the dam, reservoir, canals and other irrigation infrastructure). A common response to such problems has been to call for 'more' user participation; such calls have led to the creation, and sometimes training, of WUAs that have been heralded as the rightful entities for managing and maintaining small reservoirs at the local level.
Based on extensive fieldwork in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana and Zambia, this research study critically assessed the claims of high costs, underperformance and usefulness of WUAs. First, the claim of underperformance is not shared universally among those involved in The case of Burkina Faso clearly illustrates that small reservoirs are more than irrigation infrastructure; they are sociopolitical constructs and can act as conduits for policy moves. Small reservoirs have long been seen as key elements of an active irrigation development policy (MAHRH 2006) . At the same time, the country has been engaged in the framing and implementation of an IWRM policy since the late 1990s. Central to this policy framework is the establishment of water management entities on the basis of hydrological boundaries, notably the Agence de Bassin (five basin agencies have been set up in the country) and the Comité Local de l'Eau (CLE) (local water committee) at the local level (the CLE are meant to oversee watersheds of 2,000 to 5,000 square kilometers (km 2 )). To date, about 30 CLE have been set up (Petit and Baron 2009; Sally et al. 2011) . Initially envisaged as consultation platforms that would bring together multiple water stakeholders to drive water management at the watershed level, most CLEs were actually set up to oversee the management of a specific small reservoir, thus acting as a dam or water user committee (Sally et al. 2011) . This shows the 'reworking' that global policy models, such as IWRM, go through to meet local (in this instance, national) priorities and concerns (ensuring productive and sustainable small reservoir-based irrigation), and also the role that small reservoirs can assume as vehicles of policy choices (far beyond irrigation activities).
small reservoirs. Various groups rate performance differently, using different criteria. Government officials and extension agents of line ministries, for example, point to limited irrigated area, low yield and damaged infrastructure; they rate the performance of small reservoirs much lower than local users, who put a high value to multiple uses and equity aspects. Second, the report concludes that high construction costs are not inherent to the small reservoir 'technology' and hence not inevitable. The main cause of high investment costs appears to be poor planning and implementation practices, often underpinned by corrupt behavior. This research study reinforces earlier studies (Inocencio et al. 2007 ) which highlighted that badly planned and 'underperforming' irrigation projects are, generally, an order of magnitude more costly than well-planned projects. Poor planning and implementation is also a cause for lowquality construction; hence making it difficult for communities to properly operate and maintain infrastructure later on. Small reservoir projects have been 'locked-in' a similar 'build-neglectrebuild' cycle, as explained by Shah (2009) for the public irrigation sector in South Asia. The most common answer to these challenges to date, forming WUAs, may not be the most appropriate response to the alleged lack of the ability and willingness of communities to manage and maintain water infrastructure. In practice, an institutional bricolage of formal and informal arrangements underpins various aspects of the management of small reservoirs. For example, traditional authorities (such as village chiefs and land priests) often play a crucial role in conflict management while government officials play a key role in construction, procurement and agricultural extension. Imposing a new structure as the only legitimate decision-making body may be counterproductive, particularly because one type of user (irrigators) tends to be overrepresented in WUAs. Further, in all countries, the governance of small reservoirs needs to be thought within broader policy trends such as IWRM and decentralization. This report calls for a fresh look at issues pertaining to small reservoirs. Performance needs to be assessed from different vantage points that consider multiple uses, outcomes and perceptions. Irrigation is only one of many uses of these infrastructures; not necessarily the one that dominates or is most sought after by the population. WUAs are not the only legitimate decision-making bodies for the management of small reservoirs. Before introducing newly formed water committees, small reservoir projects would do better to explore how they could build on existing institutional arrangements. There is room to improve planning and implementation processes to achieve positive outcomes. This is, maybe, the main lesson of this study. Greater transparency and more open discussions about malpractices would be a good starting point. This is not an easy task because many actors along the planning and implementation chain are involved in an intricate web of small lapses of integrity and oversight. However, stakes are high: lowering investment costs, improving construction quality and ultimately enhancing the multiple benefits of small reservoirs for villagers in waterscarce rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa.
Small reservoirs in Zambia
Source: (a) Sichingabula 1997, and (b) this study.
Small reservoirs in Tigray, northern Ethiopia
Source: This study; based on data from the Bureau of Agriculture, Tigray, Ethiopia.
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